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Abstract—Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are emer-
ging as hardware security primitives. So-called strong PUFs
provide a mechanism to authenticate chips which is inherently
unique for every manufactured sample. To prevent cloning,
modeling of the challenge-response pair (CRP) behavior should
be infeasible. Machine learning (ML) algorithms are a well-
known threat. Recently, repeatability imperfections of PUF res-
ponses have been identified as another threat. CMOS device
noise renders a significant fraction of the CRPs unstable, hereby
providing a side channel for modeling attacks. In previous work,
65nm arbiter PUFs have been modeled as such with accuracies
exceeding 97%. However, more PUF evaluations were required
than for state-of-the-art ML approaches. In this work, we acce-
lerate repeatability attacks by increasing the fraction of unstable
CRPs. Response evaluation faults are triggered via environmental
changes hereby. The attack speed, which is proportional to the
fraction of unstable CRPs, increases with a factor 2.4 for both
arbiter and ring oscillator (RO) sum PUFs. Data originates from
a 65nm silicon chip and hence not from simulations.
Index Terms—arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, fault injection,
modeling, repeatability, supply voltage, temperature.
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE is a clear trend towards small, distributed, mobileand wireless applications. They are typically integrated
on chip. Cryptographic protection is indispensable as almost
all applications process sensitive data, but is thwarted because
of the trend above. Energy/power and chip area are scarce
resources, so we are often limited to lightweight cryptography.
Furthermore, because of the mobility, one can easily gain
physical access to the chip. Hardware attacks, either invasive
or noninvasive, are thus a significant threat.
Classical cryptography heavily relies on the ability to store
secret information. Traditionally, binary keys are stored in on-
chip Non-Volatile Memory (NVM). EEPROM and its succes-
sor Flash are the main technologies. However, this approach is
vulnerable to hardware attacks [14]. The permanent nature of
storage worsens the problem as no limits are posed on the time
frame of the attacker. Circuits that detect hardware invasion
offer additional protection. Unfortunately they suffer from
practical limitations. They might be expensive, bulky, battery
powered, vulnerable to bypassing and/or not appropriate for
lightweight environments.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been pro-
posed as a more secure and more efficient alternative. PUFs
measure the unique variability of physical objects. They can be
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manufactured in a variety of technologies: optical, acoustical,
magnetical, electrical and so on. PUFs which can be integrated
on chip, especially in CMOS technology, are by far the
most relevant for commercial applications. The manufacturing
variability of nanoscale structures is then quantified.
For PUFs, the secret is stored in intrinsic physical features
of a chip, resulting in some remarkable security advantages in
comparison to on-chip NVM. First, PUFs are often assumed
to be resistant against invasive attacks. One can argue that
invasion damages the physical structure of the PUF. Second,
keys are inherently unique for each manufactured sample of a
chip and there is no need to explicitly program them. Third, the
key is only generated and stored in on-chip volatile memory
when key-dependent operations have to be performed, as such
posing limits on the attackers time frame.
A. Weak and Strong PUFs
PUFs are functions and produce a response when queried
with a challenge. Responses and challenges are both binary
vectors. PUFs are often subdivided in two classes, depending
on the number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) [13]. Weak
PUFs have few CRPs and are typically utilized for on-the-
fly secret key generation. PUF response bits are not directly
usable as a secret key because they are noisy and possibly
correlated. A so-called fuzzy extractor ensures a reproducible
and uniformly distributed key by applying an error-correcting
code and a cryptographic hash function respectively [1].
Strong PUFs have many CRPs, in the ideal case exponenti-
ally increasing with the required chip area, and offer more
applications. It should be infeasible to capture all their CRPs
in a reasonable time span. Although secret key generation is
possible as well, the most prominent strong PUF application
is CRP-based authentication of a chip. In an enrollment phase,
the verifier collects arbitrary CRPs from the chip and stores
them secretly. In the verification phase, the verifier picks a
challenge and requests the PUF response again. The returned
response should match the one in the database. To avoid the
error-correction overhead, a few erroneous bits are typically
tolerated hereby. To prevent replay attacks, the verifier should
discard a CRP once it has been employed for authentication.
B. Security
We assume an attacker to have physical access to the PUF
chip. Remember that PUFs are claimed to resist hardware
attacks better than on-chip NVM. Restriction to an eaves-
dropping attacker would undermine the need for PUFs. As
nanoscale manufacturing variations are uncontrollable, it is
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copying the CRP behavior, is the main threat however. The
security considerations differ per application.
For secret key applications, it is imperative to keep the
responses on chip, just as the secret keys to which they
are post-processed. Hardware attacks (invasive, through side
channels and via fault injection) should be taken into account.
As mentioned before, PUFs are often assumed to be resistant
against the first category. Experimental evidence is generally
lacking however, except for the coating PUF [17]. For SRAM
PUFs, an invasive attack has even been demonstrated [3].
Electromagnetic radiation is an exploitable side channel for
ring oscillator (RO) PUFs [10]. In addition to PUF circuits,
fuzzy extractors might leak side channel information as well
[11].
For strong PUFs in a CRP-based authentation application,
CRPs can be obtained by anyone with physical access to
the chip. The security arises from the CRP behavior unpre-
dictability. It should be infeasable to construct a clone via
a mathematical model. Modeling through Machine Learning
(ML) algorithms, given a training set of CRPs, is a major
threat. The arbiter PUF, which quantifies the variability of gate
delays, can be modeled as such [9]. Variants of the arbiter PUF
which introduce additional non-linearity (XOR, feed-forward,
. . . ) provide more resistance but can still be modeled [12].
Hardware attacks on strong PUFs should be considered too,
as they can facilitate modeling. We introduced the repeatability
side channel attack and demonstrated its feasibility on 65nm
arbiter PUFs [5].
So-called controlled PUFs enhance the security of CRP-
based authentication via additional hardware [2]. Hereby, the
response bits of the strong PUF are post-processed using
a fuzzy extractor. Cryptographic hash functions are non-
invertible and modeling vulnerabilities of the CRP behavior
are hence hidden. Also, one could preprocess the challenges
with a cryptographic hash function to counteract chosen-
challenge attacks. However, the use of controlled PUFs poses
two major problems. First, the increased hardware footprint
undermines the potential for resource constrained applications.
Second, the additional building blocks are not necessarily
resistant to hardware attacks.
C. Variability and Noise
The distinction between variability and noise is essential
for a good understanding of this paper. Both cause deviations
with respect to the nominal behavior. Measurements of (struc-
tural) variability, originating from manufacturing processes,
are reproducible. One can state that they are defined by spatial
distributions (and orientations) of individual molecules of the
solid materials. Noise however is a non-reproducible temporal
phenomenon. Generally speaking, in electronic circuits, both
variability and noise are undesired. PUF circuits measure
variability, but are bothered by noise as well, as it reduces
the repeatability.
Both variability and noise are technology dependent. They
remain major design and manufacturing challenges, especially
while downscaling dimensions according to Moore’s law. Ran-
dom Dopant Fluctuation and Line-Edge/Width Roughness are
important sources of variability for CMOS devices [8]. White
thermal noise and 1/f noise affect the CMOS channel current
[7]. Interconnect is affected by Line-Edge/Width Roughness
and white thermal noise too.
D. Environment
Environmental conditions like temperature and supply volt-
age affect PUF behavior. In the ideal case, PUFs therefore
operate in a constant nominal environment, which is to be
specified. However, one can not force an attacker to obey this
specification. In this paper, we intentionally apply environ-
mental changes for PUF modeling purposes.
E. Our Contribution
Recently, we identified repeatability imperfections of PUF
responses as a side channel for modeling strong PUFs [5].
The presence of CMOS device noise, rendering a significant
fraction of the CRPs unstable, is exploited. As a proof of
concept, 65nm arbiter PUFs have been modeled, with accu-
racies exceeding 97%. However, more PUF evaluations were
required than for state-of-the-art ML approaches.
In this paper, we accelerate repeatability attacks by in-
creasing the fraction of unstable CRPs. We trigger response
evaluation faults via environmental changes. A significant per-
formance gain is obtained for arbiter and RO sum PUFs, both
manufactured in 65nm CMOS technology. Data originates
from a silicon chip and hence not from simulations. We also
describe the attack capabilities for RO PUFs, employed in a
CRP-based authentication application, although the application
use cases are rather limited.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, III and IV,
we introduce arbiter, RO and RO sum PUFs respectively. The
high-level architecture, implementation aspects and security
risks are described for each. The repeatability model of PUF
responses, capturing the impact of CMOS device noise, is
resumed in section V. Attacks exploiting the former side
channel are described in section VI for all three PUFs. Fault
injection, accelerating modeling via environmental changes,
is introduced in section VII. Side channel and fault injection
results are compared in section VIII, for 65nm arbiter and RO
sum PUFs. Suggestions for further work are given in section
IX. Section X concludes the work.
II. ARBITER PUF
A. Architecture
Arbiter PUFs [9] measure structural variability via the
propagation delays of logic gates, like ring oscillator [15] and
glitch PUFs [16]. The high-level functionality is represented
by figure 1. A rising edge propagates through two paths with
identically designed delays. Because of nanoscale manufac-
turing variations however, there is a delay difference ∆tV
between both paths. An arbiter decides which path ‘wins’ the
race (∆tV ≶ 0) and generates a response bit r.
The two paths are constructed from a series of k switching
elements. Challenge bits ci determine for each stage whether
path segments are crossed or uncrossed. Each (binary) state
3of each stage has a unique contribution to ∆tV . So challenge
vector ~c determines the arbiter time difference ∆tV and hence
the response bit r. The number of CRPs equals 2k.
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r
Fig. 1. Arbiter PUF.
CRP-based authentication with strong PUFs requires res-
ponses to have multiple bits. A single arbiter PUF produces
only a single response bit however. Two solutions, or a mixture
of both, are possible. First, one can implement multiple arbiter
circuits on the same chip, all having the same challenge
as input. Second, one can query a single PUF circuit with
multiple challenges and concatenate the responses.
B. Implementation
Our 64-stage arbiter PUFs are manufactured in TSMC’s
65nm Low Power CMOS technology [6]. Switching elements
are implemented via two 2-to-1 inverting multiplexers, as
shown in figure 2. As k is even, we still have two rising
edges as arbiter input. Each multiplexer is implemented by two
transmission gates and a static complementary CMOS inverter
to restore signal level.
s = ci
s = ci s
s
s
Fig. 2. Switching element circuit.
A variety of circuits can serve as an arbiter. Our chip
employs a NAND latch, as shown in figure 3. Two cross-
coupled NAND gates, implemented in static complementary
CMOS logic, determine and store the response bit r. Initially
inputs i1 and i2 are both zero so that memory nodes r and r
are both charged. A rising edge will discharge one memory
node and simultaneously lock the other.
i2
r
i1 r i2 i1 state
0 0 r = 1, r = 1
0 1 r = 1, r = 0
1 0 r = 0, r = 1
1 1 no change
}
Fig. 3. Arbiter circuit: NAND latch.
It is important to match the delay of both NAND gates.
Otherwise, bias is introduced and the response bit generation
degrades to ∆tV ≶ ∆tB , with ∆tB a nonzero constant. The
probability of r to be 1 (or 0) would not be 50% anymore,
assuming a symmetrical Probability Density Function (PDF)
of ∆tV with mean zero. Our arbiters are biased more than
usual because response readout logic is connected to node r
only, so that is has a higher capacitive load than node r. A
dummy inverter connected to node r would improve the bias
characteristics. A slight bias will always be present however
as manufacturing variations prevent the NAND gates from
being perfectly identical. So any modeling attack claiming to
be general, should incorporate bias imperfections somehow,
which we are able to demonstrate well for our attacks due to
the forgotten replica.
C. Vulnerability to Modeling Attacks
Arbiter PUFs show additive linear behavior which makes
them vulnerable to modeling attacks. A single stage can be
described by two parameters, one for each challenge bit state,
as illustrated in figure 4. The delay difference at the input
of stage i flips in sign for the crossed configuration and
is incremented with δt1i or δt
0
i for crossed and uncrossed
configurations respectively.
∆tIN
i
ci = 0
∆tIN + δt
0
i ∆tIN
i
ci = 1
−∆tIN + δt1i
Fig. 4. Arbiter PUF: single stage modeling.
The impact of a δt on ∆tV is incremental or decremental
for an even and odd number of subsequent crossed stages
respectively. By lumping together the δt’s of neighboring
stages, one can model the whole arbiter PUF with only k+ 1
independent parameters (and not 2k). A formal expression for
∆tV is as follows [12]:
∆tV = ~γ~τ =
(
γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1
)(
τ1 τ2 . . . τk+1
)T
with ~τ =
1
2

δt01 − δt11
δt01 + δt
1
1 + δt
0
2 − δt12
...
δt0k−1 + δt
1
k−1 + δt
0
k − δt1k
δt0k + δt
1
k
and
~γ =

(1− 2c1)(1− 2c2) . . . (1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
(1− 2c2) . . . (1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
...
(1− 2ck−1)(1− 2ck)
(1− 2ck)
1

T
.
4Vector ~γ ∈ {±1}1×(k+1) is a transformation of challenge
vector ~c ∈ {0, 1}1×k. Vector ~τ ∈ R(k+1)×1 contains the
lumped stage delays. Arbiter bias can be incorporated too,
so that the response bit is still the outcome of ∆tV ≶ 0:
τk+1 = δt
0
k + δt
1
k −∆tB .
D. Machine Learning
High modeling accuracies can be obtained through ML
techniques like support vector machines and artificial neural
networks. Given a limited set of training CRPs, algorithms
automatically learn the input-output behavior by trying to
generalize the underlying interactions. The more linear a
system, the easier to learn its behavior. By using ~γ instead of
~c as ML input, a major source of non-linearity is eliminated.
The non-linear threshold operation ∆tV ≶ 0 remains however.
In the paper proposing arbiter PUFs as a security primitive,
ML was already identified as a threat [9]. They reported a
modeling accuracy of 97% for their 64-stage 0.18µm CMOS
implementation. A more recent 65nm implementation, having
64-bit challenges too, has been modeled equally accurate [4].
Our repeatability attacks are performed on the same 65nm
chip. We circumvent the ∆tV ≶ 0 binarization by exploiting
response repeatability as a side channel. A full linear system
is obtained, which is straightforward to model.
III. RING OSCILLATOR PUF
A. Architecture
RO PUFs [15] quantify the manufacturing variability of
k identically laid-out oscillators. The high-level functionality
is represented by figure 5. A pairwise frequency comparison
(δf ≶ 0) generates a single response bit r. Each challenge
is hence defined by a pair of RO indices. Frequencies are
typically measured by counting rising or falling edges on a
wire connecting two subsequent inverters.
. . .
k
...
. . .
2
. . .
1 cnt
≶
cnt
r
Fig. 5. Ring oscillator PUF.
B. Implementation
Our RO PUF is implemented on the same 65nm CMOS
chip [6] as the arbiter PUFs. Each oscillator consists of
40 inverters and one NAND-gate, the latter being able to
enable/disable the oscillation. For improved testability, the
oscillation time can be configured and counter values are
directly accessible (frequency comparisons are performed in
software). This should not be the case however for market
products claiming to be secure.
The oscillation time is regulated by a separate RO, in-
crementing its dedicated counter. Once a user-defined value
is reached for this counter, all ROs are disabled and stop
oscillating. The more oscillations one allows, the more stable
the counter values, the more repeatable the PUF responses.
We performed an experiment to determine an appropriate
oscillation time. Figure 6 plots the noise-induced spread on
RO counter values as a function of the oscillation time. The
counter value spread for a single RO is quantified by the
normalized standard deviation σcnt/µcnt, computed for 20
measurements, with µcnt the mean value. To improve figure
quality, the spread of 8 ROs is averaged. For all further
results, we configured a value of about 1000 oscillations, as
indicated by the arrow. Responses are fairly repeatable then,
without increasing energy consumption and PUF evaluation
time unnecessarily.
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Fig. 6. RO PUF: trade-off between repeatability and oscillation time.
C. Vulnerability to Modeling Attacks
For CRP-based authentication, RO PUFs offer little secu-
rity. Their number of challenges, which equals k(k − 1)/2,
increases quadratically and not exponentially with the PUF
circuit area. As a consequence, it is always feasible to collect
all CRPs in a reasonable time span. By brute force, one is
thus able to construct a complete CRP table serving as a PUF
clone. Even worse: not all CRPs have to be collected as they
are interdependent. The total PUF entropy is only log2(k!)
bit as there are k! ways to sort the frequency values. Sorting
algorithms with complexity O(k log2(k)) accelerate the attack
[12].
Therefore, only secret key generation is recommended as
PUF application. Hereby, a fixed sequence of challenges is
applied via an internal challenge generator and response bits
are kept secret. For the sake of completeness, we will discuss
repeatability attack for CRP-based authentication, although
rather briefly.
The multiplexer-counter-comparator architecture might
greatly vary in practice. The corresponding degree of par-
allelism affects the security against side channel attacks:
measuring frequencies simultaneously offers more protection.
Actually, there is a whole spectrum in between the following
two extremes: an individual counter per RO and a single
counter accessing all ROs via a giant multiplexer. Consider
for instance the semi-invasive modeling attack proposed in
[6], where one measures oscillator frequencies via the electro-
magnetic side channel. If one can not assign these frequencies
to individual ROs, the attack is obstructed as such.
5IV. RO SUM PUF
A. Architecture
RO sum PUFs [18] provide a much larger challenge space
than their originals. The high-level functionality is represented
by figure 7. ROs are subdivided into k pairs, with each pair
having a certain frequency difference δf (digitized via coun-
ters). All δf ’s are summed, with challenge bits determining
the individual signs as expressed below. A thresholding step
binarizes ∆fV to a response bit. The number of CRPs equals
2k.
∆fV =
k∑
i=1
(1− 2ci)δfi.
δf1 ×
−1 1
c1
δf2 ×
+
−1 1
c2
. . .
δfk ×
+
−1 1
ck
∆fV ≶ 0 r
Fig. 7. RO sum PUF.
B. Implementation
The same array of 65nm on-chip ROs, selectively incre-
menting a counter via a multiplexer, is employed as analog
PUF core. We choose k = 64. Similar as for RO PUFs, CRP
evaluation is performed partly in software. The oscillation time
parameter is chosen the same.
C. Vulnerability to Modeling Attacks
More obvious as for arbiter PUFs, there is additive linear
behavior. RO sum PUFs are completely described by k + 1
independent parameters, including one dedicated parameter
to model bias effects. Using the same notation as for arbiter
PUFs, we obtain:
∆fV = ~γ~τ with ~τ =
(
δf1 δf2 . . . δfk −∆fB
)T
and ~γ =
(
(1− 2c1) (1− 2c2) . . . (1− 2ck) 1
)
.
Again, the thresholding operation is the only non-linearity in
the system. The authors of [18] already indicate ML as a threat,
although an attack has not been demonstrated. Later work
on this PUF therefore concentrates on secret key applications
instead of CRP-based authentication. We still consider this
PUF to be an interesting test specimen for demonstrating the
capabilities of our repeatability attacks.
V. PUF REPEATABILITY MODEL
Repeatability refers to the short-term reliability of a PUF
as affected by CMOS (and interconnect) noise sources. Long-
term device aging effects are not included. With R ∈ [0, 1], we
denote the fraction of the responses which evaluates to ‘1’ for
a certain CRP. The further from R = 12 , the more repeatable.
A. Model Description
A generalized PUF architecture is shown in figure 8. There
is always an analog circuit harvesting variability, which is
unfortunately affected by CMOS device noise and the envi-
ronment too. For RO and especially RO sum PUFs, there is
additional post-processing logic, which is digital and hence
fully deterministic. A signal ∆x, having mean zero in the ideal
case, is binarized to a response bit using threshold zero, also
in the ideal case. Bias might be introduced before or during
binarization, but in both cases the response bit evaluates as
∆x ≶ ∆xB . Without loss of generality, we develop our model
for the latter case.
~c
E
analog
behavior digital
∆x ≶ ∆xB r
PUF
arbiter
RO
RO sum
∆x
∆t
δf
∆f
Fig. 8. Generalized PUF architecture.
The PUF repeatability model is represented by figures 9
and 10, the former for the ideal case ∆xB = 0 only. We
assume variability and noise components to be independent so
that ∆x = ∆xV + ∆xN . As both components are the result
of very complex processes, we expect them to be normally
distributed according to the central limit theorem. Variance
component ∆xV is normally distributed with respect to the
set of all challenges, as shown in subfigures a. We assume a
zero mean and denote its standard deviation as σV . Arrows
indicate ∆xV for a particular challenge ~ci.
We collect the device noise relevant for response bit genera-
tion in one equivalent noise source. Noise component ∆xN is
normally distributed with respect to the infinite set of all PUF
evaluations. We assume a zero mean and denote its standard
deviation as σN . Subfigures b show the PDF of ∆x(~ci),
with variance and noise components determining its mean and
its spread respectively. The fraction which corresponds to a
response r = 0, is marked black. Repeatability R, as shown
in subfigures c, is computed by integrating the former PDF:
R(∆xV ) =
1
2
erfc
(
∆xB −∆xV√
2σN
)
with erfc(x) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
e−z
2
dz.
The key insight is that repeatability measurements provide
direct access to internal analog information, as expressed
below. Knowledge of neither σV nor σN is required for PUF
modeling purposes. Acquired analog information is all relative,
which is not a problem as in the end we only need the sign
of ∆xV −∆xB to predict response bits.
∆xV (R) = ∆xB −
√
2σNerfc
−1(2R).
B. Repeatability Measurements
Fraction R can be estimated by evaluating the same chal-
lenge multiple times (parameter M ). A measurement error R
is bound to be present. As a consequence, an error ∆xV on
60
PDF (∆xV )
(a)
1√
2piσV
~ci
0
PDF (∆x(~ci))
(b)
1√
2piσN
~ci
0
R(∆xV )
(c)
1
1
2
~ci
−3σV 0 ∆xV 3σV
Fig. 9. PUF repeatability model, bias excluded. (a) Normal distribution of
variance component ∆xV . (b) Normal distribution of noise component ∆xN ,
superimposed onto a particular challenge ~ci. (c) Repeatability R.
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Fig. 10. PUF repeatability model, bias included. (a) Normal distribution of
variance component ∆xV . (b) Normal distribution of noise component ∆xN ,
superimposed onto a particular challenge ~ci. (c) Repeatability R.
the estimated value of ∆xV is present too. For small ’s, the
derivative d∆xVdR serves as a scaling factor:
∆xV =
√
2piσNexp
((
erfc−1(2R)
)2)
R.
We distinguish two error phenomena making R nonzero.
First, there is the discretization R ∈ {0, 1M , . . . , M−1M , 1}. The
larger M , the less significant this type of errors. Second, there
are stochastic errors. We consider a single PUF evaluation as a
Bernoulli trial; multiple evaluations then describe a binomial
distribution. For simplicity, we could define stochastic error
R as the standard deviation of the random variable R:
R =
√
R(1−R)
M
.
Stochastic measurement error R has a maximum at R = 12
and decreases monotonically towards R = 0 and R = 1.
Scaling factor d∆xVdR has an opposing effect and is the most
dominant. It has a minimum at R = 12 . Towards R = 0
and R = 1, it increases monotonically and approaches ∞
asymptotically. We prefer measurements around R = 12 , but
consider the whole 10− 90% region as reasonable.
C. Model Validation
We provide a visual validation for our repeatability model.
Analytical PDF expressions are matched with a normalized
histogram of experimental data. For RO PUFs, we obtain
variability and noise characteristics directly from the counter
values. We evaluated 2048 ROs with M = 15. A histogram
of averaged counter values µcnt is shown in figure 11a.
We overlay a normal distribution with the same mean and
standard deviation. A histogram of counter value deviations,
with respect to the averaged values, is provided in figure 11b.
The former two plots validate the model for both RO and RO
sum PUFs.
For the arbiter PUF, we validate our model via the PDF
of fraction R. An analytical expression is given below. We
measured the reliability of one PUF circuit for 65000 random
challenges with M = 2000. A nonlinear curve fitter iterating
over two variables, σN/σV and ∆tB/σV , provides the match.
Figure 11c shows an overlay of both PDFs. Only data in the
10− 90% region has been used for better visibility. Also note
the minor bias towards r = 0, as discussed before in section
II-B.
PDF (R) = PDF (∆tV (R))
∣∣∣∣d∆tVdR
∣∣∣∣ = σNσV exp

(erfc−1(2R))2 − 1
2
(
∆tB −
√
2σNerfc
−1(2R)
σV
)2 .
VI. MODELING ATTACKS EXPLOITING CMOS NOISE
Arbiter and RO sum PUFs show a similar form of additive
linear behavior and are modeled likewise. We discuss them
first. Remark that each of their response bits contains variabi-
lity contributions from the whole PUF circuit. Next, RO PUFs
are briefly discussed. Each of their response bits is affected by
only a very small fraction of the whole PUF circuit. This turns
out to be fundamentally different from an attacker’s point of
view.
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Fig. 11. Repeatability model validation. (a) RO (sum) PUF: variance
component. (b) RO (sum) PUF: noise component. (c) arbiter PUF.
A. Modeling Arbiter and RO Sum PUFs
Figure 10c shows that R(∆xV ) is fairly linear for 10% ≤
R ≤ 90%: we call this the linear region. As ∆xV is a
linear combination of the model parameters (τ1 to τk+1 for
both arbiter and RO sum PUFs), so is R in the linear region
(approximately). Via the repeatability side channel, the PUF
degrades to a full linear system, which is straightforward to
model. Consider a set of N training CRPs, all in the linear
region and evaluated M times each: {~ci, Ri}. For N ≥ k+ 1,
we can simply solve the (overdetermined) system of linear
equations shown below in a Least Mean Square manner.
Numerically stable algorithms are described in literature.
Γ~τ =

R1
R2
...
RN
 with ΓN×(k+1) =

~γ1
~γ2
...
~γN
 .
As discussed earlier, bias is included in element τk+1. To
predict the PUF response for a challenge ~c, one should check
whether R = ~γ~τ ≶ 12 . The predicted value of R can also be
utilized to estimate the prediction certainty: the further from
1
2 , the better. This feature is not intrinsically available for ML
techniques like artificial neural networks.
One could improve the linearity by applying the transforma-
tion below. For response prediction, one should check whether
~γ~τ ≶ erfc−1(1) = 0. We do not apply this transformation as
we observe only very minor improvements for the modeling
accuracy.
Γ~τ =

−erfc−1(2R1)
−erfc−1(2R2)
...
−erfc−1(2RN )
 .
B. Accuracy Analysis
We now analyze the modeling accuracy of the former
attack in a theoretical manner. Errors in the repeatability
measurements (~R) cause an error ~τ on the PUF model vector
obtained by the attacker:
Γ(~τ + ~τ ) = (~R+ ~R) with Γ~τ = ~R.
To quantify the extent to which repeatability errors propa-
gate, one could compute the condition number κC of Γ. In our
case, a modified definition is much more appropriate. Model
error ~τ = Γ+~R is determined by the (pseudo)inverse of
challenge matrix Γ. Row i of Γ+ determines for τi to which
extent repeatability errors accumulate/cancel out. To quantify
the overall condition, we sum the elements in each row of Γ+
and subsequently average their absolute values:
κC =
1
k + 1
k+1∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
Γ+i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
To study the impact of N , we performed a simulation as
shown in figure 12. For different values of N ≥ k + 1,
we generated 1000 random challenge matrices and averaged
their condition numbers. Condition number κC decreases
monotonically with increasing N : rapidly in the beginning
and increasingly slower afterwards. As demonstrated later in
section VIII, very small values of M become feasible as
measurement errors on R cancel out efficiently.
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Fig. 12. Accuracy analysis of repeatability attacks on arbiter and RO sum
PUFs: condition number simulation.
C. Query Algorithms
A major speed bottleneck is that most CRPs are very
repeatable and hence not suitable for modeling purposes.
One might try to increase the fraction of usable CRPs by
an adaptive query algorithm. Hereby, the challenges are not
chosen at random anymore. The ability to perform small steps
of ∆xV turns out to be useful: a CRP originally in the linear
8region might remain there after making a small step. Consider
the following arbitrary challenge as a reference:{
~cREF = (c1 c2 . . . ck)
~γREF = (γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1).
One can choose challenges ~ci so that ~γREF and ~γi only
differ in element i, with i ∈ [1 k]: ~c1 = (c1 c2 . . . ck) (arbiter PUF)~c1 = (c1 c2 . . . ck) (RO sum PUF)
~γ1 = (−γ1 γ2 . . . γk 1) ~c2 = (c1 c2 . . . ck) (arbiter PUF)~c2 = (c1 c2 . . . ck) (RO sum PUF)
~γ2 = (γ1 −γ2 . . . γk 1)
... ~ck = (c1 . . . ck−1 ck) (arbiter PUF)~ck = (c1 . . . ck−1 ck) (RO sum PUF)
~γk = (γ1 . . . γk−1 −γk 1).
Only τi then contributes to the difference in ∆xV . For op-
timal performance, one should learn while querying. Actually
the principle above can also be used for an attack scheme
which estimates the elements of model vector ~τ one by one
[5]. However, its performance and usability are in all aspects
inferior to the method presented.
We do not implement a query algorithm because it has
two major drawbacks. First, one should take into account
the method by which multiple response bits are generated,
as discussed in section II-A. Modeling a single PUF is more
advantageous than modeling many parallel PUFs. That’s be-
cause query algorithms can adapt their behavior to maximally
benefit only a single PUF. Second, the rows of Γ become
strongly correlated, which increases its condition number.
D. Modeling RO PUFs
Consider a RO PUF employed in a CRP-based authen-
tication application. A single CRP evaluation does reveal
the sign of a certain δf , with CMOS device noise causing
an occasional error hereby. State-of-the-art modeling attacks
require O(k log2(k)) of these CRP evaluations. We claim
that the complexity can be reduced to O(k) via repeatability
measurements. We explain the main idea, but we do not
provide refinements or experimental results because of two
reasons. First, we do not expect a substantial gain in terms of
absolute numbers, if any, as k is limited. Second, as mentioned
before, even a simple brute-force tabulation of all CRPs would
be feasible in practice.
Repeated CRP evaluations do provide a (relative) estimate
of a certain δf , instead of just the sign. The higher M , the
better one can quantify the overlap of two counter PDFs
and hence their δf . If there is no significant overlap, only
a lower/upper bound can be provided. Consider a limited
number of reference ROs, with all δf ’s known, as in figure
13a. We assume them to cover the whole frequency range, as
suggested in figure 13b. The frequency of every RO can be
determined with respect to this set, making the complexity of
the attack O(k). Because M should be rather high and because
the number of CRPs is limited, both compared to the arbiter
and RO sum PUF attack for instance, we do not expect to
obtain a performance advantage.
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Fig. 13. RO PUF repeatability attack. (a) Reference ROs with overlapping
frequency distributions, due to noise. (b) Normal distribution of mean RO
frequencies, due to variance.
VII. FASTER MODELING VIA ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES
So far, response repeatability imperfections originate from
CMOS device noise. We increase the fraction of unstable res-
ponses U via environmental changes. So we switch from a side
channel to a fault injection approach. We still perform multiple
measurements per challenge ~ci, as required to compute a
repeatability R, but we now use L different environments
as depicted in figure 14. More generally, one could collect
multiple response bits per environmental setting, but we limit
ourselves to M = 1 for our repeatability attacks. For our
preceding environmental study, we use larger values of M
to suppress noise (majority vote). However, data of different
environments is not ‘mixed’ then, but kept separated.
PUF
E1
~ci
r1, r2, . . . , rM
L = 1
PUF
E1
PUF
E2
~ci
r1, r2, . . . , rL
. . . PUF
EL
M = 1 M = 1 M = 1
Channel
Side
Injection
Fault
Fig. 14. Measurement setup for repeatability modeling attacks via environ-
mental changes.
There are two basic data acquisition strategies for the attack.
Either one handles the challenges one by one, continuously
changing the environment. Or one applies all challenges before
performing an environmental change. We opted for the latter
strategy because of its convenience. There is no need to store
all challenges. We employed an on-the-fly approach where
9we re-seed a pseudorandom number generator with a constant
value.
We are particularly interested in CRPs with |∆xV −∆xB |
slightly too large to pose repeatability issues due to CMOS
device noise alone. Environmental changes modify delay,
noise and bias characteristics of a PUF. The impact increases
with the magnitude of the environmental deviation and is
not necessarily balanced for all three parameters of interest.
So additional CRPs are expected to become unstable when
gathering repeatability data from different environments.
An example is given in figure 15 for L = 3. A challenge
~ci evaluates to r = 1 under nominal conditions (E1), in a
repeatable manner. Variance ∆xV , noise ∆xN and bias ∆xB
all decrease for environment E3, with slightly different scaling
factors for each. The same challenge still evaluates to r = 1, in
even more stable manner. For E2 however, where the impact
is increasing, the challenge will regularly evaluate to r = 0.
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Fig. 15. Environmental changes increase the fraction of unstable CRPs.
We perform experimental measurements for all PUFs to
support the former theory. There is no need to discuss RO and
RO sum PUFs separately as their analog core is identical. But
first we define the nominal PUF environment and we discuss
the extent of deviation.
A. Environmental Experiments
Environmental deviations are chosen symmetrical around
the nominal environment E1, as in the end we want to obtain
a model for a PUF under nominal conditions. We define the
environment as the DC supply voltage VS and the temperature
T . Other environmental influences are not investigated here
and are suggested as further work. We quantify experimentally
the environmental impact on our PUFs, separately for the
supply voltage and temperature case.
The nominal supply voltage of our 65nm chip equals
1.20V. We perform a sweep from 0.95V to 1.45V in steps
of 0.05V, corresponding to L = 11 environmental settings.
The magnitude of the deviations is limited by the operability
of the chip. For the maximum voltage, we should also make
sure not to damage any circuitry.
We define the nominal temperature as 20 ◦C. Similar as for
supply voltage, a sweep is performed from −20 ◦C to 60 ◦C
in steps of 10 ◦C, corresponding to L = 9 environmental
settings. A TestEquity Half Cube temperature chamber is
hereby employed. Again, operability and potential damage of
the chip should be taken into account.
B. Arbiter PUF
For each environmental configuration, we query 32 arbiter
PUFs with the same 2000 randomly chosen challenges, using
M = 15. Figure 16 and 17 show the averaged supply voltage
and temperature impact respectively. The fraction of usable
CRPs U is rather independent of the environment, as shown
in subfigures a. So all environments are to be considered as
equally stable.
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Fig. 16. Arbiter PUF: deviations around the nominal supply voltage VS =
1.20V . (a) Fraction of unstable CRPs U . (b) Response bit flips with respect
to the nominal environment. (c) Response bias.
However, we are interested in response instabilities across
different environments, instead of within a single environment.
For each PUF instance, each challenge and each voltage
configuration, we first perform a majority vote to suppress
CMOS device noise somewhat. Subsequently we determine
the ratio of flipping response bits with respect to the nominal
environment, as shown in subfigures b.
10
−20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
(a)
U
(%
)
−20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
 
 
1 to 0
0 to 1
both
(b)
fli
ps
(%
)
−20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
38
40
42
44
46
48
(c)
bi
as
(%
)
T ( ◦C)
Fig. 17. Arbiter PUF: deviations around the nominal temperature T = 20 ◦C.
(a) Fraction of unstable CRPs U . (b) Response bit flips with respect to the
nominal environment. (c) Response bias.
For the supply voltage case, we observe a significant amount
of erroneous response bits when changing the environment.
The further from the nominal environment, the more CRPs
become unstable. Immediately around the nominal environ-
ment, there seems to be a larger increase in flipping bits. This
is an artifact however, originating from CMOS device noise
still present after the majority vote. For the temperature case,
we observe only a very minor impact of the environment. So
for our experimental fault injection attack later on, we only
consider supply voltage deviations.
We also make a distinction between ‘1’ to ‘0’ and ‘0’
to ‘1’ flipping bits. For the supply voltage case, the bias
increasingly shifts towards r = 0 with increasing supply
voltage. This effect is shown more clearly in subfigure c,
plotting the fraction of PUF responses evaluating to ‘1’. The
dashed lines represent the ±1 standard deviation interval with
respect to the 32 PUF instances.
C. RO and RO Sum PUF
For each environmental configuration, we collect counter
values for 2048 ring oscillators, using M = 15. Figure 18 and
19 show the averaged supply voltage and temperature impact
respectively. As before, the fraction of usable CRPs U is rather
independent of the environment, as shown in subfigures a.
We perform 2047 randomly chosen but independent fre-
quency comparisons to evaluate the RO PUF behavior. The
ratio of flipping response bits, with respect to the nominal
environment, is shown in subfigures b. Our conclusions are
similar as before: for the supply voltage case we observe a
much larger impact than for the temperature case. So again, we
only consider supply voltage deviations for our experimental
modeling attacks later on.
Bias turns out to be limited and rather independent of
the environment. As shown in subfigures c, bias is mainly
introduced by comparing equal counter values: the PUF should
return either a ‘1’ or a ‘0’ then. Therefore, we expect bias
to decrease for the RO sum PUF, as the standard deviation
of ∆fV increases with a factor
√
k with respect to δfV .
Repeatability results are expected to be similar however as the
noise standard deviation increases with a factor
√
k as well.
Subfigures d show that the mean frequency is rather in-
dependent of the environment. The dashed lines represent
the ±1 standard deviation interval. However, for the supply
voltage case, there is an either increasing or decreasing trend
for the counter values of individual ring oscillators, causing
response bits to flip. The environmental impact relative to the
separate ring oscillator, determining oscillation time, is of a
major importance hereby.
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Fig. 18. RO (sum) PUFs: deviations around the nominal supply voltage VS =
1.20V . (a) Fraction of unstable CRPs U . (b) Response bit flips with respect
to the nominal environment. (c) Response bias. (d) Mean counter value cnt.
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Fig. 19. RO (sum) PUFs: deviations around the nominal temperature T =
20 ◦C. (a) Fraction of unstable CRPs U . (b) Response bit flips with respect
to the nominal environment. (c) Response bias. (d) Mean counter value cnt.
VIII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We want an accurate model while keeping the number
of PUF evaluations (LMN/U ) low. We first determine an
optimal value for parameter M , in case of the side channel
approach (L = 1). For ease of comparison, we will employ
the same value for L in case of the fault injection approach
(M = 1). Subsequently we tabulate and compare accuracy
results for both the arbiter and RO sum PUF. We conclude that
environmental changes increase the fraction of useful CRPs
U without deteriorating the modeling accuracy. As mentioned
before, we only present supply voltage results.
A. Parameter M (side channel approach)
The larger M and N , the more accurate one can model.
Figure 20 demonstrates that the best accuracy-performance
trade-off is obtained for very low values of M . We plot
the modeling accuracy versus the number of usable PUF
evaluations (MN ) for M ∈ {3, 15, 29}. Data is averaged
over 32 arbiter PUF instances, but we expect similar behavior
for RO sum PUFs. The accuracy verification set counts 5000
CRPs, improved in quality via majority voting (M = 30).
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Fig. 20. Arbiter PUF modeling accuracy versus parameters M and N .
The first model can be constructed for N = k+1 = 65 and
the modeling accuracy ramps up rapidly with increasing N
afterwards. That’s because repeatability measurement errors
are dealt with efficiently. The ramp up behavior is conform
with the condition number simulation in figure 12.
The fraction of usable CRPs U is approximately constant
for large M . However, for high-performance attacks, we are
particularly interested in low values of M : the dependency
U(M) is shown in figure 21. Data is averaged over 25000
CRPs and 32 arbiter PUF instances. Again, we expect similar
behavior for RO sum PUFs.
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Fig. 21. Arbiter PUF: fraction of usable CRPs U as a function of M .
The dependency U(M) is mainly caused by the asymmetry
of discrete repeatability bins around R = 10% and R = 90%.
The larger M , the smaller the spacing between neighboring
bins, the smaller the deviations around the constant value for
very large M . Regarding overall performance, we expect the
conclusions drawn from figure 20 to be dominant. Therefore
we choose M = 3 for all further results, despite the worst-case
U .
B. Accuracy and Performance
We measure modeling accuracy via a verification set of
3000 and 5000 randomly chosen CRPs for the arbiter and
RO sum PUF respectively. Each verification challenge was
evaluated M = 15 times on 32 arbiter PUF instances and one
RO sum PUF instance respectively, with M/2 as a response
bit decision threshold. Verification data is acquired for the
nominal environment E1 (VS = 1.20V ).
Table I and II provide accuracy-performance results for the
arbiter and RO sum PUF respectively. For the arbiter PUF,
accuracies are averaged over 32 PUF instances: the mean value
and the ±1 standard deviation interval is given. The leftmost
12
column of values corresponds with the side channel approach
and serves as a reference.
Comparing the arbiter side-channel results with [5], we
observe a slight decrease in accuracy. We indicate three
possible root causes. First, another specimen of the same
chip was employed for our measurements. Second, another
sequence of random challenges was applied. Third, parameter
M of the verification set has been decreased significantly. We
do not consider this observation as very important however:
our main interest is the accuracy-performance comparison with
the fault-injection method.
side fault
channel injection
M 3 1
L 1 3
1.15V 1.10V 1.05V 1.00V 0.95V
E 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V
1.25V 1.30V 1.35V 1.40V 1.45V
N
U 7.5% 8.4% 10.3% 12.9% 15.4% 17.9%
100
85.1% 87.4% 88.7% 89.3% 88.3% 87.4%
±9.9% ±6.9% ±3.8% ±2.6% ±2.5% ±3.2%
200
93.6% 93.8% 93.9% 93.7% 93.6% 93.4%
±1.5% ±1.4% ±1.2% ±1.0% ±1.0% ±1.3%
300
94.6% 94.7% 95.0% 95.0% 95.0% 94.8%
±1.2% ±0.9% ±0.7% ±0.7% ±0.7% ±0.7%
400
95.3% 95.3% 95.6% 95.6% 95.6% 95.3%
±0.8% ±0.7% ±0.7% ±0.6% ±0.5% ±0.5%
500
95.6% 95.7% 95.9% 95.7% 95.9% 95.7%
±0.6% ±0.6% ±0.6% ±0.6% ±0.5% ±0.5%
TABLE I
ARBITER PUF: MODELING ACCURACY AND PERFORMANCE, WITH AND
WITHOUT ENVIRONMENTAL DEVIATIONS.
side fault
channel injection
M 3 1
L 1 3
1.15V 1.10V 1.05V 1.00V 0.95V
E 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V 1.20V
1.25V 1.30V 1.35V 1.40V 1.45V
N
U 3.7% 4.4% 5.7% 6.9% 7.5% 8.7%
100 96.1% 94.5% 95.2% 96.1% 95.4% 92.4%
200 98.0% 98.3% 97.7% 97.6% 97.8% 96.4%
300 98.4% 98.6% 98.4% 98.5% 98.2% 97.4%
400 98.8% 99.0% 98.6% 98.7% 98.6% 98.0%
500 98.8% 98.9% 98.8% 99.0% 98.9% 98.2%
TABLE II
RO SUM PUF: MODELING ACCURACY AND PERFORMANCE, WITH AND
WITHOUT ENVIRONMENTAL DEVIATIONS.
The more to the right in both tables, the larger the supply
voltage deviation. As discussed before, environmental devia-
tions are chosen symmetrical around the nominal value. We
observe no significant impact on the accuracy, with respect
to the side channel case. This is especially clear for table
I, which values are averaged. For the largest environmental
deviation, the modeling speed improves with an equal factor
17.9/7.5 ≈ 8.7/3.7 ≈ 2.4 for both arbiter and RO sum PUFs,
while maintaining an excellent accuracy.
ML attacks are still faster, as demonstrated for arbiter
PUFs using the same 65nm chip [4], although the gap is
closing. We propose joined efforts instead of competition
however: the presented techniques might facilitate a ML
attack. Repeatability R is a much more informative PUF
output than the (noisy) response bit r, so learning capabilities
can only benefit. Further research is therefore recommended.
Other fault injection techniques, applied either individually or
simultaneously, might increase fraction U and hence the attack
speed as well.
IX. FURTHER WORK
We are convinced that more research is required to fully
understand the attack capabilities. Other strong PUF designs
(e.g. the many arbiter PUF variants) should be examined
for potential weaknesses. We also proposed joined efforts
with ML techniques: repeatability data might be employed to
facilitate automatic learning.
Alternative techniques for fault injection could be investi-
gated as well. Consider for instance an unstable power supply,
where more noise is literally injected into the analog PUF
circuit. Electromagnetic radiation might be another idea worth
exploring. Also remark that one could use multiple fault
injection techniques simultaneously.
Countermeasures are another line of research. Additional
hardware for on-chip error correction, as in a controlled PUF,
might help. Also, one could try to detect different forms of
fault injection. One can ensure that the PUF is only operational
if the provided supply voltage is very close to the nominal
value, for instance.
X. CONCLUSION
Repeatability measurements provide a new strategy for
attacking strong PUFs in a CRP-based authentication appli-
cation. Either as a pure side channel technique or possibly
accelerated via fault injection. By applying environmental
deviations, supply voltage in particular, response bit faults
were introduced. As such we were able to increase the fraction
of unstable CRPs, hereby improving the attack efficiency. As
experimentally quantified using a 65nm CMOS chip, modeling
attacks are accelerated with a factor 2.4 for both arbiter and
RO sum PUFs, while maintaining an excellent accuracy.
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